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Guilty Plea Negotiation
Joseph N. Bongiovanni, Jr.t
The vast majority of criminal prosecutions are concluded not by
trial but by a guilty plea,' which is usually the result of an agreement
negotiated by prosecution and defense counsel and approved by the
trial judge. The range of plea arrangements is broad and perhaps im-
possible to catalogue. Among them are:
1. sentence recommendations,
2. acceptance of plea to lesser offense,
3. dismissal of some counts in an indictment 2 and
4. agreements not to seek conviction of a higher degree of a
crime in exchange for defendant's not seeking to reduce the
degree.
Negotiated pleas should be encouraged by full judicial recognition,
which would make possible substantive and procedural safeguards
either by rule of court or by legislation. 3
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Conviction without trial will and should continue to be the preva-
lent method of disposing of criminal cases, not because of expediency
but because it is a valid method which furthers social values. It pro-
vides the defendant with an opportunity to acknowledge his guilt and
manifest his willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct. It
spares him the notoriety of a sometimes protracted trial. It relieves
the prosecution from the necessity of exaggerating its case during liti-
gation. In addition, it strengthens the trial method by releasing facil-
ities and personnel for cases which must be tried.
Guilty plea negotiation is not merely a matter of convenience, but is
another method of disposing of criminal charges. Opponents of plea
t Member, Pennsylvania Bar Association.
1. SCHWARTZ, CASES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTIcE (1962). Note Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 PA. L. REv. 865 (1964); Comm. ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa.
337 (1966) 345 note 5. R. Polstein, How To "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAc. LAWYER 35.
2. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas,
112 PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
3. Comm. ex rel Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337 (1966).
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bargaining evidence a devout faith in the infallibility of trial as a
method of learning the truth. While trial is a sound procedure, it is
at best only an imprecise method of determining the truth. As any
trial judge or lawyer of experience can attest, it is certainly not infal-
lible. A trial is a legal contest; its outcome depends to a great degree
on the preparation and skill of the contestants. Negotiation is certainly
dependent on the same factors but not to the same extent.
The major problem with the plea negotiation procedure is that it
has not received full and realistic judicial approbation, thus forcing
the negotiations to be carried on sub rosa. Thus, the difficulty with
the plea negotiation technique lies in the necessity of explaining it
away.4
The courts in Pennsylvania have given only grudging approval to
one of the essential elements of plea negotiation, namely, the partici-
pation of the trial judge, despite the fact that the use of the technique
is certainly prevalent, at least in Philadelphia, its largest metropolitan
area. In Commonwealth v. Scoleri,5 the Supreme Court held that there
was no legal justification for the withdrawal of a guilty plea which de-
fendant entered on the belief that as a result of his plea he would be
sentenced to life imprisonment and not death. The Court quoted with
approval its decision in Commonwealth v. Senauskas:
It may be stated generally that for a judge to make a bargain, en-
gagement or promise in advance of the hearing of a case irrespec-
tive of what the evidence might thereafter show the facts to be and
as to what judgment he should reader therein, would be judicial
misconduct. Such agreements have uniformly been held to have no
binding effect, and they are incompatible with the powers or du-
ties of a judicial officer. The failure of a judge, who enters into an
agreement of this type, to comply with his promise gives to the de-
fendant the right to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea
of not guilty, under the theory that the plea of guilty is not bind-
ing upon a defendant when induced by fear, promises, persuasion
or ignorance. 6
Query whether the bargain, engagement or promise would be valid
if given with the understanding that if the evidence or pre-sentence
report should not be in accord with the representations on which the
promise was made the plea could be withdrawn. It is also interesting
that the court would allow a defendant to withdraw his plea upon fail-
4. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YA.E L.J. 1, 18 (1932).
5. 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).
6. 326 Pa. 69, 191 A. 167, (1937) 71-72.
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ure of the judge to comply with his invalid commitment. This would
seem to be judicial enforcement of the invalid promise except that the
rationale (namely that a defendant has a right to withdraw a plea when
induced by fear, promises, persuasion (improper) or ignorance) would
apply with equal force even where the improper commitment had been
honored.
The holding in the Scoleri case, supra, is hard to reconcile with
Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney,7 which, although decided
later, does not purport to change the law. In that case the defendant
offered a plea of guilty to second degree murder which the trial judge
accepted after ascertaining that the district attorney would not intro-
duce evidence to prove that defendant was guilty of first degree murder.
On a writ of habeas corpus, defendant attempted to upset his plea on
the ground, inter alia, that his counsel failed to present available evi-
dence that the offense did not rise above voluntary manslaughter. The
Commonwealth, conceding this, alleged that it was done in considera-
tion of an agreement by the Commonwealth to forego seeking a first
degree conviction. The Supreme Court refused to upset the plea and
upheld the bargain and plea bargaining generally with the statement
that "when surrounded by proper safeguards, [plea bargaining] is fre-
quently in the best interest of both the Commonwealth and the ac-
cused." The court drew a "distinct line" between bargaining under-
taken by defense and prosecuting attorneys on the one hand and dis-
cussions with judges who determine the sentence. The "distinct line"
is difficult to understand when the Supreme Court affirmed a proce-
durally incorrect acceptance of a guilty plea to second degree murder.
Certainly the acceptance of this plea was a commitment by the trial
judge that the sentence would not be longer than the legal maximum
for second degree murder, irrespective of what the evidence might
show. Thus a judicial commitment on sentence was condemned, but
a judicial promise on reduction of the charges was approved. It would
seem that this unrealistic distinction is perpetuated by 319(b) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
The court, with the consent of the attorney for the Common-
wealth, may accept a plea of guilty to any included offense or to
any count in an indictment and may discharge the defendant on
the other offenses or counts charged.
7. 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
8. Id. at 347, 223 A.2d at 704.
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Although it would be appropriate, there is no rule providing that the
court may express its concurrence to a sentence tentatively agreed to
by the district attorney and defense counsel.
While the question of judicial participation remains uncertain, plea
bargaining has received judicial approbation, not only in the Kerekes
case, supra, but also in Commonwealth v. McCauley,9 and Common-
wealth v. Garrett.10 The necessity of judicial recognition of the propri-
ety of a judicial commitment on sentence under specified circumstances
is becoming increasingly evident. As The Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice high-
lights:
[t]he agreed disposition should be openly acknowledged and fully
presented to the judge for review before the plea is entered. A de-
sirable change might be that before the plea is finally entered, the
judge would indicate whether the disposition is acceptable to him
and will be followed. Should the judge feel the need for more in-
formation or study, the plea may be entered conditionally and if a
more severe sentence is to be imposed, the defendant should have
an opportunity to withdraw his plea.'1
The tentative drafts of February 1967 and December 1967 on Pleas of
Guilty of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice recognize plea negotiation and judicial ap-
proval of an agreement,' 2 although they do not approve of judicial par-
ticipation in plea discussions. Section 3.3 would authorize the judge to
indicate his concurrence in the proposed disposition if the information
in the pre-sentence report is consistent with the representations made
to him, and the defendant would be allowed to withdraw his plea if
the trial judge later decided that he could not sentence in accordance
with the plea agreement which he had approved.
If the negotiated plea and sentence practice is to be properly and ef-
fectively used in the administration of justice, its role must be reexam-
ined. This has never been done judicially because the process has never
been accorded full and realistic approbation by the courts. There has
been concern about the voluntary character of a plea.13 Thus the law
9. 428 Pa. 107; 237 A.2d 204 (1968).
10. 425 Pa. 594; 229 A.2d 922 (1967).
11. P. 136.
12. Section 1.5.
13. A conviction based on an involuntary guilty plea is constitutionally void and may
be collaterally attacked; mental or physical coercion vitiates voluntariness. Machibroda v.
U.S., 368 U.S. 487 (1962). Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 61 S.C. 574 (1941).
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is clear that a plea induced by threats is invalid.14 There is also a great
deal of concern whether it is proper for trial judges to grant leniency
to defendants because they plead guilty for fear that such leniency vio-
lates the concepts of impartiality and fairness which guide the judicial
function.1 5
A sound legal principle is that a guilty plea is valid even if induced
by a prosecutor's promise which was judicially honored. No one can
quarrel with the rule that a plea induced by threats is a violation of
due process, but the concern about the propriety of granting leniency
on a guilty plea is unrealistic. Settlement in a criminal case should be,
in the main, viewed in the same light as settlement of a civil case. Ad-
mittedly there are some important differences. Parties to civil litigation
can usually settle their case without court approval. On the other hand,
criminal cases have to be settled not only with the prosecutor but also
with the court. In the main, however, the considerations are the same,
since trial or settlement are the principal tools. The parties settle to
avoid the risk of an adverse verdict or a verdict (or sentence) less fa-
vorable than can be obtained through settlement. In a civil injury
claim, plaintiff often settles for an amount which may be less than he
might obtain by verdict, because of the risk that he might obtain less.
There is no threat or promise affecting the voluntary character of his
act. It is a decision reached after considering the probabilities and pos-
sibilities of trial. Plaintiff may reject an offer and go to trial and obtain
a verdict in the same amount as was offered in settlement. This is also
true in the settlement of a criminal case.' 6
In the typical plea, defense counsel and the district attorney enter
into neg-otiations. They more or less frankly discuss their case; each
presents his theory and the evidence in support of it. Each then points
out the difficulty of the opposing theory and the weaknesses of the evi-
dence supporting it. This type of discussion goes on while opposing
counsel are trying to agree on the crime, or degree of the crime, to
14. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62. Sup. Ct. 964, 86 L.E. 1302 (1942).
15. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
16. Admittedly there are cases which would not lend themselves ethically or practically
to plea negotiation e.g., a defendant accused of a crime of which he is innocent. The
typical situation would be a murder charge in which the defendant denies that he was
even at the scene and has an alibi. In such a case defense counsel cannot either ethically
or tactically accept or offer to enter into plea negotiation. However, the typical homi-
cide is usually negotiable because it involves a situation where the defendant clearly
did the act which caused the death, but the possible verdicts are often not guilty (self
defense) to murder in the first degree. Negotiation, therefore, is usually feasible in situa-
tions where the basic facts are not in dispute, but the surrounding circumstances and the
legal results are not clear.
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which a plea can be appropriately offered and accepted. At this stage,
or afterwards, there will be a discussion about the recommended sen-
tence. Defense counsel is ready with a thorough summary of the defen-
dant's background, e.g., that he has no record or no recent record, or
perhaps no record for this particular type of crime; that he is a family
man with dependents; his employment record; his military record; his
educational record, etc. At the conclusion, opposing counsel may arrive
at an agreement on what they are willing to recommend-defense coun-
sel to his client and prosecution counsel to the court. Throughout all
this negotiation, there is ordinarily no threat by the prosecutor. De-
fense counsel makes his recommendation about a plea by measuring
the risks of conviction against the chances of acquittal. He also realizes
that the presentation of evidence in a non adversary type of proceeding
may make an entirely different (although not necessarily a less accu-
rate) impression on the thirteenth juror, who usually has the respon-
sibility of imposing sentence. But any experienced lawyer has seen
cases where the sentence after conviction by trial was exactly the same
as the one offered during plea negotiations.
In Philadelphia, the most recent practice has been for counsel to ap-
pear before the Calendar Judge in the afternoon preceding trial. The
Calendar Judge often invites counsel to confer with each other. and dis-
cusses the possibility of a plea with them. With counsel's consent, the
judge hears a summary of evidence presented by each and the status
of their negotiations. He often will then indicate what he would con-
sider to be an appropriate disposition and sentence. If counsel and the
defendant agree, the case is heard by the Calendar Judge; but if they
do not agree, it is assigned for trial before another judge. This practice
has worked effectively and fairly in Philadelphia, although it is not in
complete accordance with the recommendations of the American Bar
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice (Sec-
tion 3.3) that the trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.
Because of the hazy limbo to which plea negotiation is consigned,
the entry of a negotiated plea produces a scene in which counsel has to
use all his legal ingenuity to make it possible for the defendant to com-
ply with all the required fictions of the law without committing per-
jury. Before the plea is accepted, defendant is directly interrogated by
the trial judge to determine whether his plea is knowingly and under-
standingly made. He is required to answer that he does know that if
he pleads guilty he can be sentenced to the maximum term provided
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for the crime in question. He is told the maximum term and is re-
quired to deny that any promises have been made to him. He is usually
admonished that no promises can bind the court.
With this kind of fairy tale script it is often difficult for defense coun-
sel to persuade his client to accept his advice and plead guilty, because
what counsel must do is tell the client that as a result of his discussions
with the district attorney and the trial judge and based on his knowl-
edge of the case and his appraisal of the judge, it is his opinion that a
guilty plea will result in a certain disposition and sentence. This will,
of course, be the same disposition and sentence which have been agreed
upon by the judge and prosecutor. One could only imagine getting a
client to sign a release in a civil suit under the same circumstances!
Beyond question, the better practice would be to put the entire plea
agreement on the record, including the statements of counsel relied on
by the court. The defendant should be asked whether he understands
and approves of the agreement and should be advised that if the pre-
sentence report precludes the judge from honoring the agreement, he
may withdraw his plea. An attempt should be made both before and
after accepting the plea to determine its accuracy. Evidence should also
be produced to verify the accuracy of the representations which were
the basis of the agreement.
CONCLUSION
The negotiated plea and sentence should be openly recognized as a
valid method of disposing of criminal cases. If the decisional law does
not fully approve this tool, appropriate legislation or rules of court
should be promulgated. The proces should be surrounded by proper
safeguards, such as a complete record of the agreement reached and the
basis for the conditional judicial approval of the same. The defendant
should be asked in open court whether he understands the agreement
and whether he approves of it. He should be told that the judge's ap-
proval may be withdrawn, but if it is, he will be entitled to withdraw
his plea. On appellate review of negotiated pleas, the chief concern
should be whether the trial judge abused his discretion in approving
the negotiated plea. The defendant should not be allowed to second
guess his agreement on the ground that his plea was not voluntary be-
cause induced by a promise which was kept.
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